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NOTES AND COMMENT
FEDERAL COURTS AND DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION.
The power of federal courts in matters arising on the ground of
diversity of citizenship has been the subject of intensive legal con-
troversy for too many years. Arising as an academic problem I in
the heated days of the Constitutional Convention it has become,
through the doctrine set forth in Swift v. Tyson 2 and later evolu-
tionary additions and ramifications, a serious challenge to the logic
of our constitutional law.
The source of the controversy is the much-discussed Section 34
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,3 which provides: "that the laws
of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or stat-
utes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply." (Italics ours.)
On the face of it, the section 4 seems easily understandable, and
in the early days of its stormy existence, appears to have been inter-
preted with facility by the courts. Certainly during Chief Justice
Marshall's time, the United States Supreme Court seems tacitly to
have assumed that the federal courts in the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion based on diversity of citizenship, were bound by the decisions of
the highest courts of the state in which the action arose, provided
there were such decisions in point, whether they rested on a local
statute or on the general principles of common law.5
This seems to have been the comparatively simple state of the
law on the subject until Swift v. Tyson,6 which offered a new inter-
pretation of Section 3 4 .T Briefly stated, the problem presented to
Mr. Justice Story and his colleagues was whether or not the Supreme
"Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HAav.
L. REY. 483. This article contains the statement that the provision for federal
jurisdiction was regarded as of trifling importance by the fathers of the
Constitution.
2 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
'1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1926).
'Ibid.
'Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344 (R. I. 1797); Sums v. Irvine, 3 Dall.
425 (U. S. 1799) ; Tilfair v. Stead, 2 Cranch 407 (Ga. 1804) ; Lewis v. Har-
wood, 6 Cranch 82 (La. 1810); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (Ky.
1825); Hamilton Bank v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492 (Ohio 1829); Green v. Neal, 6
Pet. 291 (Tenn. 1832) ; Smith v. Clapp, 15 Pet. 125 (Ala. 1841).
In Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (U. S. 1827) the court said, "This
court adopts the state decisions because they settle the law applicable to the
case, and the reasons assigned for this course apply as well to the rules of
construction growing out of the common law as the statute law of the state
* * *,,
-16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
"1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1926).
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Court of the United States should follow the New York doctrine that
a pre-existing debt is not value in a case arising on diversity of citi-
zenship jurisdiction." The court, in a monumental decision written
by Mr. Justice Story, decided that the Supreme Court was not bound
to apply the common law of the state in such a case, but was free to
exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of
New York should be, in questions of general jurisprudence. The
point was made that Section 34 9 furnished a rule obligatory on the
court to follow state tribunals. In attempting to explode this doctrine
the court said:
"In order to maintain the argument it is essential, there-
fore, to hold that the 'laws' in this Section includes within the
scope of its meaning the decisons of the local tribunals. In the
ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the
decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evi-
dence of what the laws are, and are not of themselves laws.
They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by the
courts themselves whenever they are found to be either defec-
tive or ill-founded or otherwise incorrect. The laws of a state
are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments
promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long estab-
lished customs having the force of laws * *-*
"The true interpretation of the 34th section limited its
application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by
the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real es-
tate * * * It has never been supposed by us that the section
did apply, or was intended to apply to questions of a more gen-
eral nature * * * as, for example, to the construction of ordi-
nary contracts or other written instruments and especially to
questions of general commercial law * * *." (Italics ours.) 10
In effect the decision, by its interpretation of Section 34," limited
its application to positive statutes of the state and to real estate, hold-
ing that the provisions of Section 3412 could not extend to questions
of a more general nature, not dependent on local statutes or usages.
For cases of the latter type, such as the construction of ordinary con-
tracts, the federal court was guided by its own rulings and not those
of the state courts.' 3
'The New York law in this connection was not changed until 1897 by
N. I. L. §51.01 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1926).
10 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842) at 17.
11 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A .§725 (1926).Ibid.
"East Alabama R. R. v. Doe, 114 U. S. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. 869 (1885);
Bucher v. Cheshire R. R., 125 U. S. 337, 8 Sup. Ct. 920 (1887) ; Gormley v.
[ VOL. 13
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The practical effect of the Swift v. Tyson 1 4 decision was to create
with a single thrust a common law of the United States, the existence
of which had repeatedly been denied prior to that time, which often
differed from that of the state.',
The New York courts adhered to their earlier common law doc-
trine in regard to pre-existing debt even after Swift v. Tyson.' 6 Many
state courts, too, followed the New York ruling rather than the fed-
eral doctrine.17 A further example of the divergent views is shown
by Lockwood v. R. Co.,'8 which came from a federal court in New
York and in which the Supreme Court refused to follow the New
York cases relative to contracts by a common carrier against liability
for his own negligence. New York courts again persisted in fol-
lowing their own prior rulings.' 9
In spite of these differences the doctrine has been followed and
enlarged in an almost unbroken line of opinions in the federal
courts.2 0 It has developed beyond the actual question involved in
Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554 (1889) ; B. & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, 149
U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914 (1892); Folsom v. Ninety-Six, 159 U. S. 611,
16 Sup. Ct. 174 (1895); Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R., 166 U. S. 83,
17 Sup. Ct. 488 (1896) ; Stanley County v. Color, 190 U. S. 439, 23 Sup. Ct.
567 (1902) ; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 24 Sup. Ct. 399
(1903); Comm'rs & Co. v. Bancroft, 203 U. S. 112, 21 Sup. Ct 21 (1906).
1,16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
TucKx's BLACKSTONE (1803) 422-433; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591
(U. s 1834). ,
Stalkes v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1843); McBride v. Farmer's
Bank of Salem, 26 N. Y. 450 (1863); Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138 (1873).
' In the following cases state courts followed the New York rather than
the federal doctrine:
Arkansas: Bertrand v. Backman, 13 Ark. 150 (1852).
Connecticut: Webster & Co. v. Howe Mach. Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atl. 482
(1887).
Maine: Bramhall v. Becket, 31 Me. 205 (1850).
Minnesota: Becker v. Sandersky City Bank, 1 Minn. 311 (1854).
Missouri: Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106 (1853).
Ohio: Roxborough v. Messick et al., 6 Ohio St. 448 (1856).
Wisconsin: Cook v. Helms & Vandercook, 5 Wis. 107 (1856).
17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873).
"Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1841); Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864) ; Breiner v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 124 N. Y. 59,
26 N. E. 324 (1891) ; Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N. Y. 279, 77 N. E. 388 (1906).
See also Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115 (La. 1843) and Forepaugh v. R. R.
Co., 128 Pa. 217, 18 Atl. 503 (1889). In the latter case the court applied the
law of another state and followed the decisions of the state courts, expressly
refusing to follow the contrary decisions of the federal courts as to the law
of that state.
Judge Holt enumerated twenty-five differences between state and federal
courts fifty years ago. HOLT, CONCURRENT JURIsDICTION OF FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTs (1888) 162 et seq.
I Triumph Electric Co. v. Patterson, 211 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914);
Colorado Yule Marble Co. v. Collins, 230 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915);
Aktieselskabet Horn-og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebologet Atlanten,
250 Fed. 935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), aff'd, 252 U. S. 313, 40 Sup. Ct. 332 (1920) ;
Parramore v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 5 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925),
cert. denied, 269 U. S. 560, 40 Sup. Ct. 20 (1925). For lists of the earlier
cases supporting the doctrine see 28 U. S. C. A. § 725, n. 6.
1938]
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Swift v. Tyson 21 and it has been settled that federal courts may ex-
ercise their independent judgment in questions relating to contracts,22
commercial paper,2 3 insurance policies, 24 liability for injury to a ser-
vant,2 5 for negligence of servants, 26 liability of carrier of passengers 2 7
or goods, 28 or livestock, 29 the rights and duties of telegraph com-
panies,3 0 the construction and validity of a bond,31 the validity of a
release,32 and estoppel. 33 These and other additions have been held
included in the vague term "general law".
The doctrine is further beclouded by continuous assertions of
federal courts to the effect that they will give weight to state decisions
although they are not bound to follow them in order to avoid conflict
as far as possible and in case of doubt they nay, for the sake of har-
mony, lean towards the views of the state courts. 34 Insofar as statu-
tory law is concerned, federal courts regard themselves as bound to
2116 Pet. I (U. S. 1842).
'U. S. Savings, etc. Co. v. Harris, 113 Fed. 27 (E. D. Ky.; 1902);
Casserleigh v. Wood, 119 Fed. 308 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902); Ottumwa v. City
Water Sup. Co., 119 Fed. 315 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; Gilbert v. American Surety
Co., 121 Fed. 499 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902), cert. denied, 190 U. S. 560, 23 Sup. Ct.
855 (1902).2 Diggert v. Vermont L. & T. Co., 94 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899);
Northern Nat. Bank v. Hoopes, 98 Fed. 935 (E. D. Pa. 1900) ; Citizens Savings
Bank v. Newburyport, 169 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902), cert. denied, 215
U. S. 598, 30 Sup. Ct. 399 (1909).
Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842);
Washburn etc. Mfg. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., 179 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 1
(1900); Spinks v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 137 Fed. 169 (E. D. Ky.,
1905); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (E. D. Ga., 1907), aff'd, 157
Fed. 1002 (1907), cert. denied, 208 U. S. 617, 28 Sup. Ct. 561 (1908).
"Baltimore v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 871 (1893) ; Gardener v.
Michigan Cent. R. R., 150 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 140 (1893); Oakes v. Mase,
165 U. S. 363, 17 Sup. Ct. 345 (1896).
" Salmons v. Norfolk etc. R. R., 162 Fed. 722 (S. D. W. Va., 1908), aff'd,
169 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908); Farrar v. St. Louis R. R., 149 Mo. 188,
130 S. W. 373 (1910).
'Lake Shore etc. R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261 (1892);
Baltimore etc. R. R. v. Thornton, 188 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 4th, 1911).
Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. 425 (1882).
'Tripp v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 238 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sklar, 126 Fed. 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burns, 179 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
"Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. National Surety Co., 149
Fed. 507 (W. D. Mo., 1906).
'Fowler v. Pennsylvania R. R., 229 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
Newburn v. Barnesville Nat. Bank, 234 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842) ; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S.
20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10 (1882) ; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R., 125 U. S. 555, 8 Sup. Ct.
974 (1887) ; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, 11 Sup. Ct. 10 (1890) ; Baltimore v.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 871 (1893); Tampa Water Works Co. v.
Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 26 Sup. Ct. 23 (1905); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1910); Paterlin v. Memorial Hospital Assn.,
229 Fed. 838 (W. D. Pa. 1915), rev'd on other grounds, 232 Fed. 359 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1916).
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follow the decisions of the highest court of the state, construing the
state statutes.3 5
Through the years in which the doctrine has been steadily devel-
oping a series of strong dissents have appeared-dissents against the
rule introduced by Swift v. Tyson 3 6 and dissents against the con-
struction of Section 34.37 In most cases the basic criticism contained
in these dissents is the fact that Swift v. Tyson 38 runs counter to the
fundamental principle that the substantive rights of litigants should
not be varied by the accidental circumstance that the action is insti-
tuted in one forum rather than in another.
The strong dissenting voices found renewed strength as the in-
creasing difficulties with the doctrine became apparent. Aside from
the fact that many states stubbornly adhered to their rules even after
contrary adjudication by federal courts,3 9 and the fact that more and
more types of actions were gradually included in the vague term
"general law", which covered a multitude of cases, 40 there remained
the unalterable truth that what had originally been meant as a consti-
tutional safeguard to prevent discrimination against non-residents was
becoming the means through which such discrimination was effected
in favor of non-citizens. It is not seriously disputed that the sole ob-
ject for which jurisdiction between citizens of different states is vested
in the federal courts is to secure to all the administration of justice on
the same principles upon which it is administered between citizens of
the same state.41 The net result of this doctrine was that the non-
resident was given a decided advantage over the citizen of the state,
for the former could, by bringing an action in the federal court, disre-
gard the common law of the state in matters of general law, while the
citizens of a state had no such happy selection to make, but were
limited to the courts of the state for redress. It is clear, therefore,
that "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
' Jones v. Prairie Oil and Gas Co., 273 U. S. 195, 47 Sup. Ct. 338 (1926) ;
People of Sioux City, Neb. v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238, 48 Sup. Ct.
239 (1928).
' Dissent from the application or extension of the Swift doctrine was
expressed as early as 1845 in Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 (U. S. 1845). Later
dissents appeared in Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134 (U. S. 1846); Pease v.
Peck, 18 How. 595 (U. S. 1853); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175(U. S. 1863). The most vigorous attacks on the doctrine were expressed in
later years by Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149
U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. 871 (1893); and by Mr. Justice Holmes in Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1909) and Black and White
etc. Co. v. Brown and Yellow etc. Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).
3 Street, Is There a General Commercial Law of the United States (1873)
21 Am. L. IEv. 473; Hornblower, Conflict Between State and Federal Decisions
(1880) 14 Am. L. REv. 743; Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque
(1895) 8 HARV. L. Rzv. 328; Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Comon Law
(1917) 17 COL. L. Rxv. 593.
16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
= See note 16, sztpra.
40 See notes 21 to 32 incl., supra.
Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 5 Wheat. 293 (U. S. 1820).
1938]
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Amendment 42 was merely a constitutional phrase with no basis in
fact as far as this doctrine was concerned.
Corporations are, of course, one of the major groups which are
permitted the use of federal courts on the ground of diversity of citi-
zenship. 48 The theory on which this is sustained is based on the
"conclusive presumption" that the members of the corporation are
citizens of the state in which it is incorporated. 44 Many writers decry
this reasoning and regard the use of federal courts by corporations as
deplorable.4 5 The fact that corporations have been the chief benefi-
ciaries of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction served only to make the
abuses of the doctrine more apparent in connection with corporations.
The entire matter received widespread attention after the deci-
sion in Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and
Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.,46 brought to sharp realization the
increasing difficulties with the doctrine. In that case the Louisville
Railroad owned a station in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and sought to
give the Brown and Yellow corporation the exclusive privilege of
soliciting the taxicab trade at that station. Both parties were inter-
ested in preventing competition. Knowing that an agreement such as
the one contemplated would be void at common law in Kentucky, the
state of its incorporation, the Brown and Yellow corporation was re-
incorporated under the law of Tennessee and proceeded to fulfill its
contract with the railroad. When the Black and White corporation
sought to interfere with the exclusive privilege the Brown and Yellow
corporation (now a Tennessee corporation) brought a suit in the
Federal Court for Western Kentucky to enjoin competition by the
Black and White corporation. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decree granting the injunction.
Clearly, a situation where a corporate party could, by the mere
process of reincorporating, legalize a contract which was illegal in the
state in which it was entered into and where it was to have been exe-
cuted was intolerable. The case received widespread publicity in legal
periodicals and criticism of the Swift v. Tyson 47 doctrine reached a
new high.
48
Armed further with the researches of Professor Charles Warren,49
"U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV.
"FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATONS (Perm. ed., 1931) c. 51, subd. 7.
"Bank of U. S. v. Devereaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 1809); Marshall v.
B. & 0. R. R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853). See PRAsHiER, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS (1937) 20, for a discussion of the later cases on this subject.
"Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1923) 39 HARV. L. REv. 49; Frankfurter, Judicial Power of the Federal and
State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
46276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).
' 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
"Case commented on in (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 88; (1928) 2 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 80; (1929) 7 TEX. L. REv. 283; (1929) 7 N. C. L. tEv. 48.
" Professor Warren (op. cit. supra note 45) succeeded in unearthing the
original draft of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 and from the changes made
[ VOL. 13
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whose brilliant investigations led him to many startling conclusions in
connection with Section 34 and other sections of the Federal Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,50 an increasing number of legal writers took up the
task of pointing out the glaring discrepancies and the basic lack of
logic in the doctrine.51
Typical of the tenor of these articles is that of Professor Felix
Frankfurter in which he declares: 52
"Whenever that law is authoritatively declared by the
state, either by legislation or by adjudication, state law ought
to govern in state litigation, whether the forum of application
is a state court or a federal court. Swift v. Tyson with all its
offspring is mischievoiis in its consequences, baffling in its ap-
plication, and, as Mr. Charles Warren recently proved, a per-
version of the purposes of the framers of the First Judiciary
Act * * *. Deeper probably than any other rationalization of
Swift v. Tyson is the temptation of judges to make law ac-
cording to their own views when untrammeled by authority,
but whether the roots of the doctrine be in rational theory or
in obscure impulse it is now too strongly imbedded in our law
for judicial self-correction. Legislation should remove this
doctrine."
With full cognizance of the deeply-intrenched state of this prin-
ciple the Supreme Court delivered a surprising opinion in April, 1938
-and the Swift v. Tyson 53 doctrine was no more. In -Erie R. v.
in the original draft inferred that the drafters of Section 34 must have meant
decisions as well as statutes to be included in the section. After stating the
changes which were made in the section before its ultimate passage Professor
Warren concludes that the insertion of the word "laws" in place of the more
detailed enumeration of all forms of state law contained in the original draft
was intended merely to be a more concise expression. He states at page 85:
"It now appears from an examination of the Senate Files, however,
that if Judge Story and the court had had recourse to those files in
preparing the decision in Swift v. Tyson it is highly probable that the
decision would have been different and that the word 'laws' in § 34 would
have been construed to include the common law of the state as well as
statute law. This conclusion will probably be reached by anyone who
examines the original slip of paper on which the amendment containing
§ 34 was written."
1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. §725 (1926).
' Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts (1928) 13 Coie. L. Q. 499; Fordham, The Federal Courts and
the Construction of Uniform State Laws (1929) 7 N. C. L. R.v. 423; Dobie,
Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 356; Fordham,
Swift v. Tyson and the Construction of State Statutes (1935) 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 131.
'Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power of United States and State
Courts (1928) 13 Cour. L. Q. 499, 528.
' 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
1938 ]
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Tompkins, 54 the plaintiff was injured by one of the defendant's freight
trains while walking on the railroad's right of way in Pennsylvania.
He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the op-
eration of the train and that he was rightfully on the railroad's prop-
erty as a licensee because of a commonly used footpath which ran
alongside the tracks. Erie claimed, however, that he was a tress-
passer. Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought an action for
the personal injuries he sustained in the Federal Court for the South-
ern District of New York because the defendant railroad is incorpo-
rated in New York. Defendant urged that the decisions of Pennsyl-
vania, where the injury took place, imposed no liability on it. Plain-
tiff claimed that the federal court was empowered to determine the
law independently, without regard for the law of Pennsylvania. The
verdict for the plaintiff was unanimously set aside by the Supreme
Court.
Two justices, Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds,
based their opinion on the Pennsylvania law but upheld the Swift v.
Tyson 55 doctrine, decrying the action of the majority when, in their
opinion, the case was inadequately argued on this point. Mr. Justice
Reed's opinion, also concurring in result, sought to arrive at the same
conclusion by a reconstruction of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 56
to avoid the rule. The majority held that the court was bound to
apply the Pennsylvania decisions and that Swift v. Tyson 57 was
thereby overruled.
In a clear and masterful opinion, Mr. Justice Brandeis set forth
the history of the Swift v. Tyson 58 doctrine and the misconception on
which it was based, the untoward effects of the doctrine and the many
criticisms which have been levelled at it. After declaring that federal
divergency from state decisions for the benefit of foreign citizens de-
nies "equal protection of the laws" 51 the court delivered this trenchant
statement on the changed doctrine:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution,
or by Acts of Congress the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal common law. Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable to a state, whether
they be local in nature or 'general', be they commercial law
or part of the law of Torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power on the federal courts * *
'304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1926).
' 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
Ibid.
U. S. CONsT. Amend. XIV.
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Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is as Mr. Justice Holmes
said, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts
of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct'. 60  In dis-
approving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional Sec-
tion 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other act
of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine
this court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
states." (Italics ours.) 61
It is this writer's opinion that the alternative opinions written
by Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Reed only lend greater value
to the squarely-faced issue presented by the majority. Mr. Justice
Brandeis and his associates have refused to allow the continuation of
the rule, regardless of how firmly imbedded in our law it has become,
because they regard it as based on an unconstitutional construction
of Section 34.62 In arriving at this conclusion the court has borrowed
in part, at least, from the famous dissents and has stated the change
in the law in accord with the great weight of scholarly legal opinion. 63
It must not be supposed, however, that the case is immune from
criticism. The language of the opinion is broad enough to include
even those cases where the federal courts have original jurisdiction
and other situations of which no mention is made in the decision. For
instance, federal courts have maintained from the earliest date of their
functioning right down to the present that the principles of equity
jurisprudence which they apply need not be the rules of the several
states.64 If we are to take the Erie decision literally when it declares
"the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state" 65 (italics
Dissent of Holmes, J., in- Black & White etc. Co. v. Brown & Yellow etc.
Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928) at 532-533.
I304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 822 (1938).
In a case decided after the preparation of this article (Schopp v. Muller
Dairies, Inc., decided Oct. 20, 1938, reported in N. Y. L. J. of Oct. 27, 1938,
p. 1, col. 3) the Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled
squarely on the Erie holding. The jurisdiction of the court was based on
diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff brought the action for personal injuries
sustained by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant. The burden of
proving freedom from contributory negligence rests on the plaintiff in New
York, whereas in the federal courts the defendant is required to prove such
negligence. The court held that under Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, federal courts
were required to follow the New York rule in this connection and declared that
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, declaring that contributory negligence
was a matter of substantive law rather than procedure.
1 STAT. 92 (1789), 26 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1926).
See notes 35, 36, mtpra.
'Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 108 (U. S. 1818); Pusey & Jones v.
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1922); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284
U. S. 521, 52 Sup. Ct. 517 (1921); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30,
55 Sup. Ct. 584 (1935).
n304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
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ours) it would seem that equity suits would also be included within
the scope of this ruling. A careful analysis of the language of the
decision, however, reveals that such a result could not have been antici-
pated by the court. The court, throughout its entire opinion, makes
continued references to the lack of differentiation between state law
initiated by decision and state law declared by statute. The trouble-
some statement "there is no federal common law" 66 refers directly
to the statutory and common law distinction contained in the previous
sentence. We are not impelled to say on the authority of these phrases,
as one writer has, that "the decision by its sweeping language * * *
unsettles the entire structure on which the federal judicial system is
based",67 because, as we view it, the clear result to be anticipated is
that the decision will be limited to cases arising on concurrent juris-
diction and will not be extended to those cases in which the federal
courts have original jurisdiction (e.g. bankruptcy matters, etc.) nor
will it be held to include federal suits in equity.
The implications of this monumental decision are many and far-
reaching. It is impossible at so early a date to state with any assur-
ance the permanent results it will bring. Certainly it can be said that
it throws the entire theory of our constitutional law towards a de-
centralized movement, and away from the nationalistic basis of Swift
v. Tyson. 68
The obvious result of the case is that decisions of federal courts
on questions of general law are no longer authoritative. The liti-
gants and the federal courts must now look for and apply the entire
body of substantive law governing the identical action. 9 In a case
decided one week after the Erie case,70 which also arose on diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction, certiorari had been granted (prior to the
Erie 71 decision) because a Circuit Court of Appeals had reached a
result in conflict with another circuit court on the same matter. The
purpose of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to grant certiorari is to
promote uniformity in issues of state law and certiorari was, there-
fore, granted in this case. Under the Erie decision,7 2 however, it can-
not be anticipated that all the circuits will be in accord and conflict
among the circuits would no longer be a reason for granting certiorari.
The court said that had the Erie 73 decision been announced earlier,
certiorari might not have been granted in the Ruhlin case.74
1IMid.
'Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 26
A. B. A. J. 421.
16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
Address by George W. Wickersham, Esq., at the Commencement exercises
of St. John's University School of Law, June 8, 1938.
" 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
nIbid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
1, 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860 (1938).
[ VOL.. 13
NOTES AND COMMENT
It would seem, therefore, that the Erie Ry. v. Tompkins 75 case
will result in a divergence of views in the federal courts, a situation
which could not have arisen with the earlier doctrine. In its place,
however, there is the long-awaited advantage of consistency within
the realm of the particular state, and a single set of laws for the state,
with no possibility .of altering the legal result by a diversity of citi-
zenship plea.
The broad principle on which the Swift doctrine 76, was based
may yet be attained. The principal reason for the Swift doctrine 7
was repeatedly stated to be that it would lead to uniformity among
the states when they all adopted the federal views. This result was
clearly not accomplished by a continuation of the doctrine. It would
seem, therefore, that other forces must be used to gain that desired
end, particularly the exchange of learning and the constant agitation
of bar associations throughout the country for the cause of uniformity
through action of state legislatures.
EDYTHE R. DUClcER.
CIRCULATION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A FREE PRESs.
In order to comprehend completely the scope of the question
under consideration here, it is essential to examine at some length the
significance of the phrase "freedom of the press", as the framers of
the First Amendment understood it.
I.
The constitutional guaranty of a free press is found, not in the
Constitution of the United States itself, but in the First Amendment
which reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances."
The generally recognized common law definition of the term
"freedom of the press" is that stated by Blackstone:1 "The liberty
" 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
7 Ibid.
14 BL. Commi. 151, 152. For state constitutions that have been influenced
by Blackstone's definition in wording their free press provisions see Index
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